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ABSTRACT 
  
This paper reports a comparative qualitative study of how decision-makers in internationalizing 
SMEs respond to relevant institutions in their domestic environment through networking 
activity. Twenty SMEs are compared respectively from a developing economy (Egypt) and a 
developed economy (UK). The two countries contrast both in the effectiveness of their 
institutional support for SMEs and in their cultural norms towards network relationships. 
Substantial differences are found between the two national samples in SME decision makers’ 
networking behaviour in response to specific institutional conditions. The links between 
institutional conditions, national cultural norms and SME networking responses are explicated 
in a new theoretical model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it is recognized that there are interdependencies between institutions and networks, 
the links between them remain under theorized (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). One link is 
manifest in the non-market strategies of firms by which they endeavour to secure the support 
of institutions, and even shape their policies, through networking processes such as lobbying, 
co-optation and relationship management (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun & Siegel, 2016). However, the 
examples studied have focused on large firms that have the resources and influence to engage 
the attention of institutional bodies and their officials (e.g. Frynas, Pigman & Mellahi, 2006; 
Hadjikhani, Elg & Ghauri, 2012; Child, Tse & Rodrigues, 2013). Smaller firms are likely to 
experience much greater power asymmetry vis-à-vis institutions and may therefore need to 
depend more heavily on the help of intermediaries, particularly in contexts where their rights 
to institutional access and support are limited (Child & Rodrigues, 2011).  
 
Smaller firms tend to rely on external parties in order to secure information, resources and other 
support for strategic initiatives such as entering new foreign markets (Harris, Rae & Misner, 
2012). The significance in this respect of institutions for internationalizing small firms has 
come to be recognized in recent years (Cheng & Yu, 2008). Government institutions promoting 
SME business development and foreign trade can offer critical assistance in furthering such 
initiatives (Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006; Descotes, Walliser, Holzmuller & Guo, 2011; 
Makhmadshoev, Ibeh & Crone, 2015; Oparaocha, 2015).  While there is a general need for 
more comparative investigation of how domestic institutional conditions affect the 
internationalization of firms (He & Cui, 2012), this applies particularly to the case of SMEs.  
Comparative research on the relation of institutions to SMEs, and on how SMEs respond to 
institutional conditions, promises to provide a fruitful basis for further theorizing.   
 
Comparisons across countries suggest that their institutions can affect small firms in different 
ways and to varying degrees (Ciravegna, Lopez & Kundu, 2014; Kiss and Danis, 2010).  In 
some countries they offer them financial and informational resources, while in others they 
provide little such support and even erect barriers in the way of business initiatives (Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2014; World Bank, 2015). This distinction is reflected in two 
perspectives: the institutional support perspective and the institutional void perspective 
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(Stephan, Uhlander & Stride, 2015). The institutional support perspective assumes that 
governments and their agencies can effectively promote small business entrepreneurship 
through providing necessary resources, especially when these are made accessible under the 
terms of clear universalistic rules. The institutional void perspective by contrast implies that 
not only can there be a lack of institutional support for entrepreneurship, but that the business 
environment as a whole may be rendered uncertain by inadequate institutional rules and their 
weak enforcement (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Institutional voids often manifest as "gaps 
between formal rules and norms, and their enforcement in daily practice" (Rodrigues, 2013, p. 
14).  
 
SMEs seeking to internationalize may depend on domestic institutions to provide financial 
assistance and/or market information, or for securing relevant business licenses. The literature 
on international entrepreneurship has to date generally focused on the institutional context as a 
given external factor and hardly examined the use by SMEs of initiatives such as networking 
to overcome deficiencies inherent in their external context (Tracey & Phillips, 2011). Also, 
there has been little research on how SMEs try to cope with specific institutional voids, 
especially in developing countries (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Obloj, 2008). Coping behavior 
includes ways in which SMEs may seek to adapt to, or compensate for, institutional voids by 
seeking support through networking (Ellis, 2011; Musteen, Datta & Butts, 2014; Su, Xie & 
Wang, 2015).  
 
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of networking by internationalizing 
SMEs in the light of domestic institutional conditions and cultures. The model is informed both 
by extant literature and by an exploratory empirical investigation that compares SMEs located 
in a developing country context (Egypt) and a developed one (UK).  These two countries 
contrast in their general level of institutional development and specifically with regarding 
agencies officially promoting SME internationalization. Two forms of institutional void among 
such agencies will be apparent, especially in Egypt.  These respectively concern the quality of 
formal support schemes and the ease of access to them.  We adopt an agentic view of the 
relations between SMEs and domestic institutions. In institutional theory, this view maintains 
that while institutions establish certain conditions for organizations, decision-makers in those 
organizations have the ability to adapt purposively to such conditions (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008).  The accounts and interpretations of SME decision-makers themselves are therefore 
used as sources which offer insights into how their networking is both a response to institutional 
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voids and is also culturally-influenced.  It is important to stress that the empirical evidence 
offered by the paper is exploratory and qualitative, and intended to inform a process of theory 
development rather than to be used for theory-testing. Its concentration on SMEs promises to 
provide a well-defined ground for the study of how institutional characteristics relate to firm 
behaviour.  As already noted, a common attribute of SMEs is that they are likely to be 
dependent on, or at least highly welcoming of, institutional support. Secondly, the focus on 
internationalization serves to identify a specific set of public institutions that have the formal 
mission of promoting exporting.   
 
As well as advancing a theoretical framework, the paper adds to knowledge in other more 
specific ways. It elaborates the concept of institutional void by taking account of deficiencies 
both in terms of technical inadequacies and of dysfunctional social behaviour.  It shows that 
this distinction is significant for understanding the responses of SME entrepreneurs as 
institutional clients.  Second, it reports one of the few studies to demonstrate that the 
networking of small business entrepreneurs is influenced by their experiences of the institutions 
established to assist their international business objectives.  This extends our understanding of 
SME networking behaviour. Third, its empirical investigation includes Egypt which is a 
relatively under-researched economy in the international entrepreneurship literature. Fourth, 
the paper illustrates that differences in national development and cultures are associated with 
contrasts in both institutional behaviour, and in the responses of SME decision-makers.  This 
illuminates the need to incorporate both cultural and economic perspectives in international 
business research as well as multiple (country context and firm) levels of analysis.  
 
The following section draws from the literature and documented sources to identify the 
relevance of domestic institutions for internationalizing SMEs and how they contrast between 
Egypt and the UK.  The question of culturally-informed networking responses to institutional 
conditions is then considered. This is followed by an explanation of the methodology of the 
empirical investigation.  While the national comparisons rely on secondary data, evidence on 
networking by SME decision-makers and how they account for it, draws upon primary data 
provided by the actors themselves.  The discussion analyses the findings leading to the 
development of a theoretical model. We conclude with implications, limitations and lines of 
further research. 
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INSTITUTIONS AND SMEs 
Significance of institutions for SMEs 
SMEs seeking to engage in international business can benefit from domestic institutional 
resource-provision in terms of furnishing information on foreign markets and the conditions 
for doing business in them, as well as providing financial support for participating in trade 
missions, for making contacts in foreign markets, and for underwriting payment risks (Francis 
& Collins-Dodd, 2004; Wilkinson & Brouthers, 2006). Information on foreign markets and 
financial aid for new market entry are among the most significant of such resources to support 
foreign transactions (Liesch & Knight, 1999; Brouthers, Nakos, Hadjimarcou & Brouthers, 
2009). Unless SMEs can secure alternative sources of these resources, through for example 
forming partnerships with MNEs (Das, 2015), they are liable to be dependent on institutions 
for key resources assisting their internationalization. Additionally, in some countries 
institutional approval is required for firms to engage in certain categories of foreign business. 
This means that they have a critical resource dependency on particular institutions (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005).  If institutional support is deficient in quality, or 
is withheld, SMEs seeking to export may be disadvantaged. Furthermore, institutions may act 
dysfunctionally for internationalizing SMEs by, for instance, operating corruptly or imposing 
restrictions on access to their services.  Voids in this institutional sector can therefore arise 
from two factors: institutions’ technical inadequacies and the imposition of negative informal 
conditions on their support. 
 
The extent of such voids is expected to vary as between developed and developing economies. 
A relationship between levels of institutional and economic development has been noted for 
some time (Acemoglu, 2010; Chang, 2011).  SMEs located in developing economies tend to 
suffer from relatively weak institutional contexts, in which the enactment of laws and 
regulations is inefficient, corruption and bureaucracy tend to be prevalent, and supporting 
educational systems and infrastructures are limited (Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008).  The 
institutional environment of less-developed countries is likely to be problematic for firms, 
because its immaturity creates uncertainty and adds to transaction costs (Farashahi & Hafsi, 
2009; Chrysostome & Molz, 2014).  Even emerging economies, so-called because they 
combine high rates of growth with moves to reform their market and other institutions 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000), offer lower levels of institutional support to firms 
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than is typical of developed economies, and have business environments that are less stabilized 
by universalistic rules (Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008).   
 
The contrast between developed and developing economies suggests that the former are 
characterized to a greater degree by “hard institutions”, whereas in the latter “soft institutions” 
are more salient. Hard institutions are manifest in legal and other formal rules, akin to what 
have been called “formal” institutions. By contrast, soft institutions manifest themselves in 
social and cultural norms, and traditional customary practices – akin to so-called “informal” 
institutions (North, 1990; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Soft 
institutions are culturally informed and may serve up to a point to compensate for gaps in, or 
failure to apply, hard institutional provisions (Tully, 1995; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Wiener, 2006).  
 
A comparison between Egypt and the UK serves to illustrate the developing/developed 
economy contrast in institutional provisions to facilitate SME internationalization.1  According 
to the World Bank (2013) country classification, Egypt is a low-middle income developing 
economy, while the UK is a high income developed economy. A FTSE report in 2010 classified 
Egypt as a secondary emerging economy, and the UK as a developed economy.  Egypt’s per 
capital income in 2010 was US$ 2,804 while that of the UK was US$ 36,573 (World Bank, 
2014). There is a clear contrast in the two countries’ levels of development, and this is 
accompanied by a parallel contrast in the extent to which they exhibit institutional voids.   
 
The indicators set out in Table 1 consistently show that Egypt has significantly more 
institutional voids relevant to business than does the UK.  The first two indicators adopt the 
criteria of institutional voids suggested by Rodrigues (2013), namely the extent of open 
government and regulatory enforcement. Scores from the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law 
Index (Agrast, Botero, Martinez, Ponce & Pratt, 2013), indicate that Egypt is considerably 
lower on both criteria than the UK.  Egypt also scores much lower for absence of corruption 
according to Transparency International’s comparative index. Data from the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey rate Egypt as a consistently less favourable business 
environment than the UK regarding diversion of public funds, irregular payments and bribes, 
favouritism in decisions of government officials, and transparency of government 
                                                 
1 Where possible data refer to 2010, the year immediately preceding the 2011 revolution in Egypt, which matches 
the timing of the first round of data collection. No official data from the World Bank is available after 2014. 
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policymaking. Finally, Egypt scores low on the presence of government programmes at 
national and regional level to support new and growing firms. Coping with government 
bureaucracy and regulations are obstacles facing SMEs in Egypt, while difficulties are also 
reported with obtaining permits and licences. In 2010 Egypt occupied the 41st rank in terms of 
the efficiency of government support programmes compared to the 20th rank occupied by the 
UK (GEM, 2010). Furthermore, after the revolution Egypt occupied the 52nd rank in terms of 
the efficiency of government support and relevance compared to the 19th rank occupied by the 
UK (GEM, 2015).  Overall, Egypt has a greater incidence of institutional voids both in terms 
of technical competence and in terms of negative informal practices. 
 
Table 1.  Contrasts in Institutional Voids between Egypt and the UK 
 
Indicator and source Egypt UK 
Open government 2 
World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 
(Agrast et al., 2013) 
 
0.48 
 
0.78 
Regulatory enforcement 8 (Agrast et al., 2013) 
 
0.42 0.79 
International Corruption Index 2010: Score for absence of 
corruption (range 10 to 0) among 178 countries 
(Transparency International 2010, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results#CountryResults) 
 
 
3.1 
 
7.6 
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2011. 
(World Economc Forum 2011, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2011-2012 Indicators derived from the Executive 
Opinion Survey are expressed as scores on a 1–7 scale, with 7 
being the most desirable outcome: 
Diversion of public funds 
Irregular payments and bribes 
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 
Transparency of government policymaking 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 
3.8 
2.6 
3.8 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7 
5.9 
4.3 
5.2 
The contribution of government programmes to 
entrepreneurship support: rank out of 53 countries 2010. From 
National Experts Survey (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 
2010).   
 
 
41st 
 
20th 
 
  
                                                 
2 Data are for 2012. Earlier information was not available for Egypt.  The index is constructed so that 
1=the highest possible score and 0=the lowest. ‘Open government’ is assessed by three indicators 
reflecting whether laws are publicised, stable and accessible.  ‘Regulatory enforcement’ is assessed by 
three indicators indicating whether regulations are enforced effectively, without improper influence and 
unreasonable delay. 
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In Egypt have three government agencies that officially offer support for SME 
internationalization (GEM, 2010). The Social Fund for Development [SFD] had helped SMEs 
in the late 1990s, when it offered loans to firms with simple requirements, sponsored them to 
attend foreign and domestic trade fairs and even provided incubator services for software 
companies. However, the SFD management changed and began to impose conditions that made 
it difficult for companies to obtained loans.  It also became a legal requirement that if an SME 
were to get support from the SFD, it had to apply for a loan first.   
After the revolution, the Egyptian economy depended to a great extent on foreign aid, subsidies 
and loans from European bank, World Bank and grants from rich Arabic countries. Those 
grants especially from World Bank and European bank focused mainly on offering support to 
SMEs in form of services rather than loans and covered the salaries of the SFD staff.  The other 
two agencies were the Industrial Marketing Centre [IMC] and Expo-link. The IMC and Expo-
link differed from the SFD in that they were sponsored by foreign aid sources such as the EU 
and Japan. However, the majority of their managers were Egyptian, with a few foreign donor 
representatives. They targeted certain sectors and industries, and offered financial assistance 
towards the cost of international certifications, foreign trade fairs, and the like. In principle, 
Egyptian embassies abroad could also assist internationalizing SMEs, but none of those studied 
reported that they had received any help from this source. 
 
In the UK, UK Trade and Investment [UKTI] was the government funded agency with the 
mission to promote foreign trade and inward investment. It supported various schemes which 
were typically run by local chambers of commerce (UKTI, 2011). The UKTI also had 
responsibility for commercial staff in UK embassies abroad who often provided considerable 
assistance to SMEs seeking to enter the local foreign market. The UKTI provided SMEs with 
access to information, advice from international trade advisors and other staff based both in the 
UK and in foreign consulates and embassies, help in identifying business leads in foreign 
markets, sources of funding available for SMEs to participate in trade fairs, and other financial 
assistance programmes.  UKTI advice was mainly directed at new exporters but some was also 
given to established and experienced exporters. 
 
Networking, institutional contexts and cultural effects 
The presence of institutional voids can lead to the marginalization, even exclusion, of relatively 
powerless actors such as SMEs (Mair, Martí & Ventresca, 2012). Small firms are likely to have 
to rely on the mediation of local partners and other network contacts to cope with this situation 
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(Child & Rodrigues, 2011). Networking is expected to be particularly critical for smaller firms 
in developing economies that have high external dependency on problematic institutions 
(Senik, Scott-Ladd & Entrekin, 2011).   The network perspective has come to be emphasized 
in analyses of the internationalization process.  Johanson & Vahlne (2009) argue that 
“insidership” in relevant networks is a prerequisite for successful internationalization. In view 
of their vulnerabilities and/or newness, networking benefits are likely to be especially 
significant to internationalizing SMEs (Bell, Crick & Young, 2004; Wincent, 2005; Coviello, 
2006). 
 
There is evidence suggesting that when institutional voids are present in a country, forms of 
networking and other adaptive behavior are more likely to reflect national cultural norms 
(Chakrabarty, 2009). In developing countries with immature formal institutions, SMEs need to 
rely on strong particularistic ties to facilitate their internationalization (Kiss & Danis, 2008).  
Many developing economies are characterized by collectivist and particularistic cultures in 
which strong cohesive relationships are valued and favoured (Hofstede, 2001; Nardon & 
Steers, 2009). This implies that entrepreneurs from such countries will tend to compensate for 
institutional voids by relying on their personal relationships (social ties) in dense networks to 
access resources, information and necessary help (Uzzi, 1997; Miller et al., 2009; Kiss and 
Danis, 2010).  The greater incidence of institutional voids in Egypt, particularly a lack of 
transparency in formal institutional procedures, is expected to encourage SME decision-makers 
in that country to resort to informal networking as a means of securing institutional support and 
reducing business uncertainties (Miller, Lee, Chang & Breton-Miller, 2009).   
  
By contrast, SMEs from developed economies such as the UK are embedded in contexts well-
endowed with the physical and information resources that are crucial for doing business in 
foreign markets. They generally have a relative abundance of the resources that their decision-
makers need to undertake successful internationalization (Covin & Miller, 2013). These 
economies not only have institutional provisions for supporting SME internationalization, but 
formalized and transparent procedures are in place for accessing such provisions. Such 
procedures are consistent with their more universalistic cultural norms.  Their SME decision-
makers are also able to sign up to, and rely on, formal means of transaction governance − 
especially contractual agreements − when dealing with external parties in their home 
environment where the legal enforcement of contracts is generally more reliable. Consequently, 
they are less likely to have to rely on informal networking with officials, either directly or 
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through the agency of “brokers”, in order to secure the support they require for 
internationalization (Peng, 2003). Moreover, in developed economies, more information is 
likely to be publicly available or accessible through weaker external links.   
 
A country’s cultural traditions may therefore influence the networking behavior of SMEs in 
relation to relevant institutions. Developing countries that are still emerging from historically-
embedded traditions tend to exhibit different cultural influences on networking to those found 
in developed societies. Whereas cultural scores for the UK tend towards universalism, 
individualism and low uncertainty avoidance, the cluster of Arab countries to which Egypt 
belongs tend toward high particularism, collectivism and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 
2001, Nardon & Steers, 2009).3  The relatively few studies of Egyptian culture emphasize 
sensitivity to personal relationships including the duty of friends to perform favors (i.e. 
particularism) (e.g. Ezzat, 2003; Leila, Yassin & Palmer, 1985; Nydell, 2012, Ralston, Egri, 
Riddle, Butt, Dalgic & Brock, 2012; Youssef, 1994).  In Egypt, the term wasta refers to, ‘who 
I know’, through whom ‘I can pull some strings’ and ‘who can I consult’, within my family 
and friends’ social networks, in order to help me find my way through an issue (Smith, Huang, 
Harb & Torres, 2012).  The higher score for collectivism in Egypt suggests that, compared to 
their counterparts in the UK, the heads of Egyptian SMEs are more likely to engage with dense 
networks composed of strong and long-term ties. This, together with their tendency toward 
particularism, implies that they will draw heavily on friends, family, colleagues and long-term 
acquaintances to gain access to information and resources and to solve problems encountered 
as a result of institutional voids. The greater valence given to particularism in Egyptian culture 
also implies an expectation that institutional rules and procedures will not be applied equally 
to everyone and that cultivating a special relationship with officials is necessary and normal. 
This is consistent with the use of Wasta in terms of finding someone in a high position to get 
things done faster and even to obtain approvals (Hutchings & Weir, 2006). The relatively high 
incidence of uncertainty avoidance in Egypt implies a reluctance to rely on weaker impersonal 
ties rather than those which have a strong trust basis. 
 
By contrast, the securing of institutional support in developed economies does not need to rely 
so much on establishing special connections or informal practices, and indeed such behaviors 
                                                 
3 As the study by Ralston et al. (2012) found, there is nevertheless a degree of heterogeneity within the so-called 
“Arab cluster”. 
12 
 
may not be regarded as legitimate in cultures characterized by norms of universalism and 
individualism (Hofstede, 2001; Nardon & Steers, 2009; Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). These norms 
emphasize adherence to general rules and place limited value on particularistic socially-
supportive relationships (Dodd & Patra, 2002; House et al, 2004). Culture scores for the UK 
suggest that decision-makers there will rely less on private social networks to reduce 
uncertainties about expanding abroad, and that in their dealings with institutions they expect to 
be treated the same as everyone else on a standard and transparent basis. The salient features 
of the Egyptian and UK institutional and cultural contexts are therefore expected to reinforce 
each other in encouraging contrasting uses of network attachments to assist internationalization 
(Covin & Miller, 2013).  
 
The foregoing argument associates both the conduct of institutions and how citizens cope with 
institutional voids with cultural norms of behavior.  The relationship between national cultures 
and levels of national institutional development has been subject to considerable debate, and it 
remains an open question as to how much, and under what circumstances, institutions shape 
cultures and vice versa (Child, 2000; Alesina & Giuliano, 2013). It has been argued that 
economic development is associated with both cultural evolution and institutional development 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  There is general agreement that national institutions and cultures 
are mutually informative and supportive (Hitt, Franklin & Zhu, 2006).  Indeed, the two 
concepts are elided in the hard-soft institution duality in which cultural norms and orientations 
can be regarded as equivalent to respectively the normative and cognitive pillars of institutions 
(Scott, 2014). Cultures are “carriers” of institutional norms and values (Scott, 2008), while 
institutions are bearers and embodiments of cultures (Leung & Ang, 2009). Culture shapes 
subjective expectations regarding habituated behavior, and institutions embody and reproduce 
its manifest characteristics (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  This common element is captured by 
Bourdieu’s (1990) concept of “habitus”: a system of durable, transposable dispositions which 
are both structured and structuring.  In other words, although cultures are ultimately subjective 
and difficult to assess social phenomena, it is reasonable to assume that when comparing 
different countries both the behavior of institutional officials and the ways in which citizens 
interpret and respond to such behavior will tend to reflect cultural norms. Of present relevance 
is the possibility that in the presence of institutional voids, especially weak rules and 
procedures, cultural norms provide points of reference for coping behaviour to fill the gaps.   
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SCOPE AND METHOD  
Sample  
The main objective of this paper is to develop an empirically-informed theoretical framework 
that proposes how institutional characteristics in different national contexts lead to patterns of 
SME networking. The empirical contribution to developing the framework necessitated a 
research design that allows for an in-depth and holistic understanding of a complex social 
phenomenon (Yin, 2009). We employ a qualitative multiple case study design, which has an 
important advantage over single-case study or ethnographic studies, allowing for a balance 
between having a relatively rich and detailed insight and a sufficient number of cases to identify 
recurrent patterns and themes. 
 
The research setting involved well-established internationalising SMEs located in two contexts 
that contrast in their level of economic and institutional development. This setting offers 
several advantages.  It provides a strong basis for comparing the nature of institutional support 
as well as SME decision-makers’ networking responses to institutional voids and 
dysfunctionalities. Secondly, both countries exhibit cultural differences which may inform the 
networking behaviours of SMEs. 
 
The study covered 20 Egyptian and 20 UK SMEs, all companies of over ten years standing. 
Both samples were similarly distributed between manufacturing and service companies. 
Fifteen of the Egyptian SMEs were manufacturing and five were service; sixteen of the UK 
SMEs were manufacturing and four were service. They had all been operating in international 
markets for at least six years. We conducted two rounds of data collection.  The first round 
involved a visit to each firm during the period 2009-2011 for a personal interview with its 
founder and/or the manager responsible for its international business development (the 
“decision-maker”). The second round of data collection involved a follow-up visit to ten of the 
Egyptian SMEs (half of the sample) to investigate the situation after the 2011 revolution. Table 
2 provides an overview of the cases.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and overview of the cases (means and SDs) 
 
 
 
Data collection 
We relied primarily on qualitative data from in-depth semi-structured interviews with SME 
decision makers and representatives from governmental supporting agencies.  In addition, 
emails and phone calls were used to ensure that the selected cases matched the sampling criteria 
and to clarify inconsistences, while reference was made to archival data such as company 
websites, business publications, newspaper clippings, annual reports, project biographies and 
databases, company’s promotional materials and the publications and reports of support 
agencies. 
 
The interviews were conducted by the first author who is an Arabic native speaker and who is 
also fluent in English.  Egyptian interviews were carried out in Arabic and then translated into 
English. To check the reliability of the translation, three transcripts were back-translated from 
English to Arabic by a professional bilingual translator/editor. A total of 54 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in the two countries during the first round of data collection (before 
the start of the Egyptian revolution). Another ten follow-up interviews were conducted in 2016, 
with those SMEs that survived the political upheaval and unrest that took place after 2011. 
Since in most of the SMEs, decisions on internationalization and relations with agencies were 
taken by one person, it was only appropriate to interview additional informants in a few firms. 
Each interview lasted on average between one and half to two hours, typically producing 20 
pages of single-spaced transcript based on structured open-ended questioning. Fifty of the 
interviews were tape recorded.  
 
  Age of 
the firm 
 
Number of 
employees 
Age at first 
internationalisation 
Percentage 
of foreign 
sales 
Number of 
overseas markets 
UK cases 
(N=20) 
Mean 38 
 
71 
 
 
9 
 
58 
 
22 
 
Standard 
deviation 
28 96 15 35 20 
Egyptian 
cases 
(N=20) 
Mean 17 
 
74 
 
5 
 
51 
 
9 
 
Standard 
deviation 
4.8 63 4.4 28 2.8 
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The interviews covered the dealings of SME decision makers with domestic institutional 
agencies relevant to their internationalization, the extent to which they encountered 
institutional voids, the networking they initiated with those institutions and other parties who 
played a crucial for their internationalisation, and its perceived benefits and costs. Respondents 
were encouraged to give reasons for decisions taken on international initiatives and networking, 
as well as their interpretation of the situation that had informed the decisions. Four additional 
interviews were also conducted with trade advisors and managers of governmental supporting 
agencies in the UK and Egypt in order to understand the type of support these supporting 
agencies offer to SMEs and the criteria through which SMEs become eligible for different types 
of support.   
 
Data preparation and analysis 
After writing up each case individually, material from the transcripts was classified with 
respect to issues involved in relations with institutions and characteristics of the SME’s 
networking. The classification was replicated independently by another researcher and there 
was 91 percent overall agreement.  Instances of disagreement were resolved through 
discussion.  As a further check, feedback on these findings was provided to three of the 
Egyptian interviewees and two of the UK ones to confirm that they matched their experiences, 
and they suggested no changes. 
 
The SMEs’ experiences with domestic institutions described in the interviews were classified 
into the categories shown in Tables 3 to 6 below.  We were particularly interested in the 
qualitative nature of the network ties that SME decision-makers in the two countries had both with 
institutional actors and with contacts relevant to their institutional relations.   Three tie qualities 
were assessed – tie strength, tie function, and whether the tie was primarily business or social in 
nature.  Ties were classified as either "weak" or "strong" (Granovetter, 1973). The strength of tie 
was measured within the course of the interview through the concentric circles approach 
commonly employed by sociologists (Borgatti & Everett, 2000). The aim was to identify 
varying degrees of strength for each group or type of actors.  This meant that after asking 
about the full history of SME from inception until the time of data collection, we grouped key 
ties mentioned by the interviewee into categories and asked her/him to locate the strongest tie 
to the SME on the closest circle to the centre (SME) and weakest tie on the farthest circle and 
any medium strength relationships to be located in middle circle. However, in some cases the 
interviewee identified the strength of a particular tie(s), within the course of our conversation. 
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This was taken into account as a key representation of the strength of that particular tie. As 
well as the identity of network ties, the functions for the SME attributed to them were also 
assessed and this enabled us to pinpoint ties directly relevant to the SME’s relations with 
institutions. Network ties were classified as “social” in nature if they involved personal 
relationships with family, friends, acquaintances and colleagues.  They were classified as 
“business” ones if they were arms-length or governed primarily by contract. For the sake of 
simplicity, if at least 60 percent of an SME’s total ties were classified as social ties then the 
SME is said to have depended primarily on social ties and vice versa.  
 
 
FINDINGS  
 
Institutional voids and SME networking – Egypt 
The Egyptian SMEs generally had a greater dependency on institutional agencies than did their 
UK counterparts.  Not only could the Egyptian agencies place restrictions on the SMEs, but 
the Egyptian firms tended to have fewer non-institutional network ties to rely on as alternative 
sources of information and support.4  All but one of the Egyptian decision-makers interviewed 
related one or more negative experiences of dealing with institutional agencies that had a 
charter to assist SME internationalization.  In the cases where they had received assistance 
from them, they reported that this was not easy to obtain. Their narratives portrayed the 
problems posed by institutional voids in Egypt.  These problems are categorized in Table 3 
along with an illustrative quotation from the interviews.  
 
The six first-order categories of Egyptian institutional voids which emerged can be grouped 
into two second-order categories.  The first of these indicates a low level of competence on the 
part of public agencies, while the second reflects a restriction of institutional support, in some 
cases unless a bribe is offered. Bureaucratic obstructions, ad hoc changes in regulations, a 
failure to take advantage of trade agreements, and poor institutional performance fall into the 
first category. Difficulties in obtaining relevant licenses and lack of staff motivation fall into 
the second category. 
  
Table 3. Egypt: Problems posed by institutional voids 
                                                 
4 For this difference between Egyptian and UK SMEs, p < .05 (Mann Whitney U test). 
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Category of problem 
 
Example 
 
Bureaucratic obstructions 
to exporting, especially 
when financial aid is 
sought 
"In Egypt there are numerous obstacles [in the way of SME exporting] such as 
official documents and letters of credit that are submitted to official authorities 
concerned with exporting such as banks. The general exporting association asks 
for loads of papers and supporting documents that take time and are too 
complicated, and at the same time do not guarantee you will get your money". 
Ad hoc changes in 
regulations 
"One day we woke up and found from a newspaper that our export minister had 
restricted the export of recycled plastics. If you do so, you pay a fine of $1000 
per ton and our profit was only $200 per ton…We had a contract and we had to 
fulfil our commitment. We tried to talk to the officials but no use and as you know 
this is Egypt, and you wake up every day there is always a change. It is a very 
uncertain business environment, you cannot predict for five years ahead, not even 
for one year, as tomorrow something dramatic could happen". 
Failure to take advantage 
of bilateral trade 
agreements 
"Egypt has several trade agreements like COMESA [Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa], the Arab League and the Quiz Agreement between Egypt, 
USA and Israel but we never use them…either because the government 
employees obtain no immediate gain from it or they are simply unaware of them". 
Poor institutional 
performance 
"The SFD lacks the necessary market knowledge about, for example, quality 
standards that are required by European or North American markets needed.  Its 
departments report to some people in senior positions who set targets for them 
that, let’s say, they need to help 5 or 6 SMEs to participate in a trade show.  All 
they care about is these numbers and not necessarily the quality of service they 
offer or whether people benefit from them or not". 
Difficulty of obtaining 
relevant licences 
"It took me believe it or not nearly ten years to get registered..[..]….I had to go 
through the whole process and it did not work, sorry to say, but under the table 
was one way to get my papers approved I would not call it bribe I would call it a 
gift to get through to the concerned employee to have a look at the documents I 
submitted...In order to finish it you have to pay a lot of gifts, you find open 
drawers, payments under the table". 
Lack of staff motivation The founder of a company producing medical equipment reported that: "The SFD 
sponsored me and others to an all-inclusive Egyptian products trade fair in Italy.  
We were given a very limited space to set up our booth and beside me was a guy 
who presented clothing and food, and next to him was someone who produces 
carpets. When I complained about this to the commercial attaché appointed by 
SFD to organize the fair, his response was 'you should thank God that you got the 
chance to come to Italy". 
 
 
 
All the Egyptian respondents mentioning these institutional voids stated that personal contacts 
were necessary in order to address them.  In the first place, such contacts were required to 
obtain information about the services that institutional agencies could potentially offer SMEs. 
This information was not readily available through formal public channels. As one founder 
decision-maker said: "the biggest advantage of good relationships in Egypt is that they 
introduce you and direct you to where you can get needed information".  The leader of a 
software firm said that “it was through my parents’ close links with people in the Ministry of 
Exports who told them about the incubator facility offered by the SFD”.  Generally speaking, 
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information about institutional services helpful to SME development and exporting was 
obtained through personal contacts rather than through publicly accessible media channels. 
 
Personal contacts were also often necessary to activate support from institutions or to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles they imposed.  The head of a firm producing marble, who was refused 
help by the IMC to attend a major annual trade fair, commented that "unless you know someone 
in the IMC and/or are one of the big players who control the economy, you will not get such 
support". The founder of the manufacturing company who was the source of the second 
quotation in Table 3 only sorted out his problem through finding a contact who opened the way 
for a meeting with the export minister: 
"We finally found a contact that exceptionally opened a way for us to meet the minister. 
You cannot meet the minister on your own…you know how things are in Egypt. So 
through this contact we met the minister and it was sorted.  It took about six months to 
get it sorted, but eventually we got the problem sorted out.  Unfortunately because of 
this problem I incurred a lot of losses which made me close this line of business and 
stick to software as a much safer option". 
 
Knowing the right person in relevant institutions, or having a personal connection who could 
effect that link, was a theme mentioned by three-quarters of the Egyptian interviewees.  Even 
when access to institutional approval or support was gained through personal networking, gifts 
and under-the-table payments would often be required to get action taken. While they 
complained about the system, they accepted that this was "the way things are done in Egypt" 
and that this was, in effect, an embedded characteristic of the national culture. The heavy 
reliance on personal links also limited the number and type of foreign markets which the 
Egyptian SME decision-makers felt able to enter – primarily those in the MENA region. These 
were markets with which network partners had their own personal links and knowledge, and 
which, given the uncertainty of institutional support, they felt it more comfortable to enter.  
 
 
Some Egyptian respondents commented that in the absence of formalized rights of access, 
smaller firms were at a disadvantage in securing the attention of institutional official compared 
to large and leading firms. A senior official in the SFD admitted that due to lack of resources, 
the agency had to prioritise larger firms that were seen to contribute proportionately more to 
the Egyptian economy. Five SMEs, whose decision makers were initially unable to access 
19 
 
institutional support on their own, created their own informal industry groups to exercise direct 
pressure to gain personal access to the export minister. Through collective action they were 
able to offset their liability of smallness and leverage a degree of power vis-á-vis the institution.  
 
It was evident that SME decision makers rely on a range of network attachments to cope with 
institutional dysfunctions inherent in the Egyptian context. In many cases they sought to access 
institutions through informal channels; in some other cases they organized among themselves 
to open up such channels, and in other cases channels to the institutions were established 
because the SMEs’ established reputation as exporters lead government agencies to seek them 
out as role models. Their description of the network attachments they relied upon fall into the 
four categories summarized in Table 4.  Some interviewees gave related examples that fell into 
more than one category. 
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Table 4.  Egypt: Use of network ties in response to institutional voids 
Use of network 
ties to cope with 
institutional voids  
 
Examples of voids 
being filled 
Type of tie and 
strength 
Illustrative quotation Cost/negative consequences 
associated with the use of network 
attachment to cope with voids  
Performance outcomes  
A referral from a 
close friend, 
family member or 
a colleague 
outside the 
institutional 
agencies. 
 
 
To get information 
about sources of 
support not 
elsewhere readily 
available or to use 
these network ties to 
facilitate access to 
overseas markets. 
 
These were 
predominately 
personal 
relationships 
(more than 60% 
of total ties). They 
were strong ties to 
highly dense 
networks. The 
SME decision 
maker trusted 
these ties and 
relied on them 
extensively on to 
enter overseas 
markets or to 
learn about 
available sources 
of support and 
finance [in terms 
of who and where 
to ask]. 
 
"We got to know about it [SFD] 
through an outing with friends and 
business people who mentioned that 
they heard about something called 
SFD, even if these people didn’t 
know much about it. They provided 
us with a hint and then we chased 
up the information and started to 
ask ourselves who we know that 
might know anything about this. 
Then I told Mr A one of my distant 
relatives who works in one of well-
known governmental agencies. So I 
asked him what do you know about 
SFD what so they offer, where can I 
find it ...etc. this person gave me 
the beginning of the thread which 
was the most important thing for 
us." 
 
In order to access support and 
advice when needed, SME decision 
makers had to continuously nourish 
the relationships with their key ties, 
even when there was no immediate 
requirement of them. In 7 cases, 
decision-makers bought gifts and 
exchanged favours in order not to 
lose the relationship.  
 
For example: 
"We had to keep in touch with 
those key relationships. We would 
call them regularly send gifts and 
cards on special occasions such as 
weddings and new births, and 
sometimes organise dinners in 
Ramadan and invite all sorts of 
people even those we haven’t asked 
for a favour for years, so as to keep 
the relationship going in case we 
need to ask them for a favor or 
advice in the future… I am afraid 
this is the only way to survive". 
These SMEs operated in only 
a limited number of overseas 
markets, principally where 
they had a family or a friend 
connected with a market. 
 
 "Our initial export attempt 
was to Holland and Germany 
through my relative who 
owns a warehouse and 
through him I managed to 
furnish houses for some of 
his friends in 
Germany…[..]…. It’s the 
same when we exported to 
Italy or the US – usually a 
family or a relative… I 
would not export to overseas 
markets except through 
people I trust to help me 
enter these markets… I have 
only few of these cases". 
 
 
Having or finding 
a connection with 
a key decision 
maker in the 
institutional 
agencies.  
 
 
This is the so-called 
"Wasta", Decision 
makers rely on their 
close friends/family 
to connect them with 
strategic 
intermediaries [such 
as key government 
officials and 
SME leaders, 
mainly founders, 
relied on strong 
personal 
relationships to 
get in touch with 
intermediaries. 
The 
intermediaries 
"To get support from IMC I had to 
be recommended to them through 
one of those people at the top … I 
asked my cousin-who is well 
connected- to find me an 
appropriate contact and to ask him 
to recommend me to the decision 
committee to get some support. It is 
very difficult to survive in Egypt let 
Maintaining a relationship with key 
intermediaries, especially those 
from whom favors are sought, is 
costly and time consuming  
 
According to the founder of a  
company that relied extensively on 
ties to intermediaries: 
These SMEs were mainly 
slow internationalizers, who 
operated in a limited number 
of markets, as it took them 
several years to establish their 
company’s domestically and 
to access needed resources to 
export.  
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facilitators] to 
overcome 
bureaucracy, access 
support and obtain 
needed licences.   
then affect a 
contact with a key 
institutional 
official. 
Relationships 
between the SME 
leader and 
government 
official are one-
off or of limited 
duration. 
alone to succeed and grow 
overseas".  
 
 
"In case of relationships you devote 
all the sources of power and 
strength to build them. But not once 
– you have to do this on A 
continuous basis and these sources 
of strength have to be built 
continuously, otherwise they 
collapse". 
Creation of 
informal industry 
group to gain 
attention and get 
support. 
 
 
 These were groups 
of competitors and 
suppliers who came 
together usually as a 
result of one initiator   
to pressure the 
government to 
change certain laws 
or to access a 
particular type of 
support (such has 
access to foreign aid 
money allocated only 
to certain industries)  
These were strong 
business 
relationships that 
took a long time 
to develop.  They 
were enduring but 
often dormant, 
being activated 
only when 
needed. 
"I grouped several of the furniture 
manufacturers here in this industrial 
zone and I was elected to be the 
director to speak to the export 
minister to ask him to make it 
easier for us to import wood and he 
listened only because we were a 
group of companies not simply one 
or two".  
 
 
To create such informal industry 
groups takes time and energy. 
Especially if the initiator has to 
convince his competitors to 
collaborate with each other and that 
this is for a collective benefit rather 
than an individual one.  
 
 
These SMEs where the most 
successful category of 
companies in our sample. 
They operated in a relatively 
large number of overseas 
markets.  
Securing 
institutional 
assistance for 
exporting on the 
basis of evident 
success in the 
domestic market. 
 
 
The decision 
maker(s) relied on 
friends/family  and 
former colleagues to 
grow in  the domestic 
market  [such as key 
contacts in state 
owned department 
stores, hotel chains 
and holding 
companies]. After 
which institutional 
agencies approached 
these SMEs and 
offered them support. 
These were 
predominately 
strong personal 
relationships.  
"Back then, the SFD did not offer 
me any support, though the bank 
gave me a loan because I registered 
with the SFD.  Later when our 
brand became well known, I found 
them contacting me and suggesting 
there is this trade fair and we want 
you to participate at short notice. I 
was surprised and said ‘how 
come?’...It’s again a matter of 
knowing people ". 
  
This is a lengthy process, with no 
guarantee of a positive response 
from institutional agencies. 
 
The time it took to gain an 
established domestic reputation in 
order to gain support or permission 
to export delayed the firms’ 
internationalization. 
These SMEs were offered 
substantial support and 
resource at a later stage of 
their development that 
allowed them to expand 
internationally.  
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The first category involved a referral from a close friend, family member or a colleague located 
outside an institutional agency, where this served as a means to gain access to information 
about available institutional support and accessing overseas networks.  The relationships 
activated here are strong and primarily social ties to dense networks. The second category was 
concerned with having or finding a connection with a key decision maker within an institutional 
agency. In both categories, the connection with a key gatekeeper, decision maker or strategic 
player served as a platform for SMEs to gain access to support. The ties with the intermediaries 
were strong social ones, though the secondary ties to the institutional agencies were weak and 
of limited duration. The third category involved the creation of an informal industry group to 
gain attention and obtain support from the institutional agency. The ties among members of the 
industry group were strong ones of a primarily business nature that took a long time to develop. 
The fourth category was different to the others in that it did not involve a proactive initiative 
by the SME.  Institutional access arose from the firm becoming an established player in the 
domestic market with a good track record of successful exporting.  Here reputation and 
legitimacy led to an approach from the institution, which as a result offered support.  
 
Limited institutional voids and SME networking – the UK 
The overwhelmingly critical narrative that was typical of the Egyptian decision-makers’ views 
on institutions was absent from the accounts of the UK interviewees.  Almost half of them 
mentioned no problems at all in dealing with institutional agencies. While the problems listed 
in Table 5 did arise, they experienced few institutional voids relating to export support. The 
majority of the firms (14 out of 20) had used official export promotion services and with two 
exceptions found them helpful.  Some were highly favourable in their comments, such as the 
founder of a manufacturing SME who said that "the UKTI and the local chamber [of 
commerce] were key domestic relationships that helped me a lot...they were key to our 
survival".  Support activities such as advice on how to export, partial funding to participate in 
trade missions, and linking with UK overseas commercial staff who provided introductions to 
potential customers were valued, especially in the early stages of targeting new foreign 
markets.   
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  UK: Problems posed by institutional voids 
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Category of problem Example 
Inability to provide 
sufficiently customised 
niche information  
"Regarding UKTI and other governmental supporting agencies, I find working with 
them is not very useful because of the nature of our market and it is a very niche one. 
If we were in agriculture or the medical field where it is a clear cut area or segment 
of industry, these companies will benefit and find the information they need from 
these agencies. However, the tobacco industry is a very niche one". 
 
Insufficient attention to 
some emerging markets  
“They [UKTI and overseas embassies] were not very helpful in some parts of the 
world”.  
 
Lack of knowledge of 
institutional  staff and/or 
their knowledge is inferior 
to that of the SME 
entrepreneur  
 
"We didn’t use them…. Because I think at that time we felt that we were self-
sufficient and we had the ability to handle it ourselves...we did not need their 
services; they would not add much to us that we already don’t have". 
 
Internal institutional 
inefficiencies  
"UKTI don’t seem to be one UKTI they seem to be about 300 and I know that’s an 
exaggeration and but it is a problem...I used to get a phone call from somebody saying 
they are from UKTI and they are different…they seem to be tripping over each other 
and not everyone knows what others do". 
 
 
The institutional voids reported by the UK firms all related to problems of agency competence. 
There were no instances where access to the institutions was stated to be problematic or 
conditional on social contacts. Nor was there any claim that the domestic institutional system 
in the UK could obstruct internationalization. When criticisms were made of institutional 
support, they normally referred to two sets of issues.  As Table 5 illustrates, the first set 
comprised three first-order categories: an inability to provide sufficiently customized niche 
information (including criticism of tick-box formalization); insufficient attention to some 
developing economy markets; and institutional staff having less knowledge than the SME 
decision-maker.  The second set of problems was mentioned in only three cases and these 
concerned internal inefficiencies such as a lack of coordination within the primary institutional 
agency. 
 
In the main, the UK companies had developed a range of non-governmental network contacts, 
such as with customers, chambers of commerce and professional advisors, which they utilized 
to support their international expansion over a wide range of foreign markets. As Table 6 
indicates, they often relied on their own ability to generate network attachments where 
necessary to compensate for a limitation in institutional knowledge about markets or contacts. 
In three cases, they had secured helpful advice from professional export promoters in chambers 
of commerce who provided information on, and introductions to, the various schemes funded 
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by UKTI.  Most of the SMEs were members of their local chambers of commerce. In contrast 
to the case of Egypt, these contacts were primarily of a ‘business’ (non-social) fee-paying 
nature and the firms’ relations with them had a contractual basis. They normally developed 
such contacts through their own initiative rather than relying on referral through social ties. 
Moreover, coming from a stronger institutional context, they could rely more on legally-
enforceable contracts and other institutional supports to hedge against internationalization 
risks. The schemes on offer are formalized, transparent and relatively accessible. Compared to 
their Egyptian counterparts, UK SMEs have more opportunity to access diverse sources of 
information and resources, and consequently their internationalization is less constrained. The 
networking behaviour of the UK SMEs vis-à-vis institutions was compatible with their general 
patterns of networking. 
 
25 
 
Table 6.  UK: Use of network ties in response to institutional voids 
Use of network 
ties to cope with 
institutional voids  
 
Examples of 
voids being filled 
Type of tie and strength Illustrative quotation Cost/negative consequences 
associated with the use of 
network attachment to cope 
with voids  
Performance 
outcomes  
Relying on their 
ability to create 
their own 
network 
attachments to 
compensate for  
an institutional 
void 
 
Lack of 
knowledge of 
institutional  staff 
and/or their 
knowledge is 
inferior to that of 
the SME 
entrepreneur  
 
 
Insufficient 
attention by 
agencies to some 
emerging markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inability to 
provide 
sufficiently 
customised niche 
information 
 
 
These were predominately 
business/contractual 
relationships, and mainly 
involved weak ties. The UK 
SMEs had large sparse 
networks.  
 
 
 
 
"My business is straight 
forward and I refer to rely on 
private agencies in African 
markets because they know 
the rules of the game or my 
own personal contacts in this 
market….the UKTI will not 
provide me with market 
information that I cannot 
obtain myself”. 
 
"We find that the 
information that we gather 
ourselves either through the 
internet or through people 
we know is better; it’s more 
on the ground information”.  
 
"The UKTI has been very helpful for us 
in India…so in the case of India and 
some emerging economies they are very 
good...but in other places they are not 
helpful so we depended on our contacts 
and intermediaries that we had in these 
markets or sometimes even established 
new relationships through the alliance I 
told you about”.  
 
"Because we had our contacts and 
knowledge we did not need their 
[UKTI’s] help other than for funding a 
costly journey such as going to Brazil”. 
 
 
This has been mostly a 
successful strategy. However, 
five SME decision makers 
reported instances where these 
weak business ties became 
problematic and led to 
withdrawal from overseas 
markets. For example: 
 
 
"We have always relied on 
agents/distributors to sell our 
products in almost every market 
we operate in. However, this 
strategy was not successful in 
Middle East. For example, we 
found out through one of our 
former clients that our agent in 
Tunisia was selling our products 
with his name on it and making 
a higher profit margin than what 
he told us …[..].. We could not 
take him to court … it takes 
ages and I am not sure it would 
be successful….. We ended up 
withdrawing from this market". 
These SMEs 
operated in a large 
number of 
overseas markets 
and in diverse 
regions.  
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Help from other 
professional 
contacts to learn 
about institutional 
support  
 
 
Limited public 
information about 
institutional 
support schemes. 
SME decision-makers relied 
on their own local 
connections to gain 
information or support.  
 
.  
“We hadn’t got any idea about how to 
export…My accountant said I can put 
you in touch with an organization called 
the UK trade forum located in 
Birmingham…I became a member and 
though that became  aware that UKTI 
had money available to support 
businesses like mine”. 
Relying on existing local 
networks sometimes shielded 
the decision-maker from 
opportunities to expand into 
other markets or to build 
relationships in those markets 
where they did not have a 
contact 
 
 
These SMEs 
operated in a 
limited number of 
overseas markets.  
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Reference to the experiences related by interviewees therefore indicate that, the contrasts in the 
networking initiatives of Egyptian and UK SMEs in support of their internationalization do 
reflect an adjustment to differences in institutional voids.  While it is difficult to disentangle 
the functional rationales informing their networking from behaviour that is culturally-
informed, the contrasts that emerged are consistent with differences that scholars have 
discerned between Egyptian and UK (British) cultures.   
 
DISCUSSION  
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of networking by internationalizing 
SMEs in the light of domestic institutional conditions and cultures. Findings from a qualitative 
comparison of Egypt and the UK indicate that both level of economic development and cultural 
behavioural norms need to be incorporated into such a model. While virtually all the SMEs 
stood to benefit from support from institutional agencies, those in Egypt tended to be more 
dependent on such agencies. Moreover, the conditions for obtaining that support were 
substantially different due to the greater incidence of institutional voids in Egypt. The technical 
competence of export promoting agencies in Egypt was generally less developed than those in 
the UK and, significantly, access to their assistance was less governed by clear universalistic 
rules.  In Egypt, the presence of institutional voids was evidenced by a disjuncture between the 
formal definition of institutions and their actual performance in respect of providing support to 
SMEs. In the absence of universalistic rules, or adherence to them, SMEs decision-makers in 
Egypt typically resorted to informal social connections in order to achieve access to 
institutional officers and their assistance.   
 
The nature of the social mediation toward institutions through networking reported by Egyptian 
respondents not only reflects institutional conditions but is also consistent with that country’s 
cultural norms [“the way things are done here”], especially concerning particularism, 
collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. The reliance on strong personalized networks 
characteristic of Egypt was almost entirely absent from the UK sample. It is likely to be 
employed far less in countries like the UK where cultures and institutions emphasize 
universalism, and where individualistic social actors with low uncertainty avoidance are more 
willing to rely on weak business-like network ties. Overall, the conclusions to be drawn from 
our study elaborate the observation made by Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger & Dunlap (2013, p.329) 
that social ties in developing economies are "an informal cultural-cognitive institution that fills 
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the voids created by the weak legitimacy of a country’s formal regulative and normative 
institutions". We elaborated on the nature of these ties with reference to their strength, function 
and nature. 
 
Figure 1 brings together insights from both literature and our exploratory study in a theoretical 
model. In the model, institutions are assumed to have specific formal purposes and rules. Their 
practical application is moderated by the national context, particularly its level of economic 
development and the character of its national culture.  Level of economic development has 
consequences for institutional competences, while culture conveys norms about the role 
behaviour of institutional officials. Institutional voids results from a gap between formal 
specifications and their application in practice. These voids in the form of competence 
limitations and behavioural dysfunctions have consequences for SMEs to the extent that they 
depend on institutional resources and other support. These two forms of void in turn trigger 
SME adaptive behaviour. If the voids primarily take the form of limited technical capability 
and (as in the UK) SMEs do not depend heavily on institutional support, they are likely to 
pursue other means to facilitate their internationalization and need not take extra measures to 
secure institutional attention. If, on the other hand, there are significant institutional voids in 
the form of limited accessibility and transparency, then SMEs requiring institutional support 
will need to find networking channels to secure institutional attention.  The greater the 
dependence of SMEs on institutions, the more negatively asymmetrical is their power vis-à-vis 
those institutions and the more effort they need to expend to cope with institutional voids. This 
coping behaviour is itself seen to be informed by national cultural norms concerning 
networking relationships such as appropriate and necessary ways of securing of services from 
others (such as the role of favours).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Figure 1.  A model of networking by internationalizing SMEs in the light of domestic institutional voids and cultures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National context 
1. Level of economic 
development 
2. Cultural norms, esp, 
universalism vs  
particularism;  
Individualism vs 
collectivism 
 
Formal institutions 
Specified formal 
institutional 
purposes and rules, 
including attention given 
to the needs of SMEs 
Institutional voids 
Actual institutional 
support of SMEs in terms of 
1. Technical capability 
2. Accessibility and  
    transparency 
Cultural 
norms 
informing 
networking 
relationships 
 
SME networking 
modes 
  
Dependence of SMEs 
on institutions 
 
Need to secure 
institutional attention 
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Figure 1 indicates that in order to understand the responses of small internationalizing firms to 
domestic institutional voids, an analysis is required that (1) combines institutional and cultural 
referents, and (2) crosses macro (culture, level of development), meso (institution) and micro 
(firm) levels of analysis. This implies that studies into the factors which account for variations 
in networking by internationalizing SMEs should extend beyond present emphases on the firm 
level in terms of factors such as entrepreneurial experience and firm sector (Child & Hsieh, 
2014), and take into account as well the socio-economic environment in which the SME is 
embedded (Lu, Liu, Wright & Filatotchev, 2014). 
  
Our findings suggest that in contexts like Egypt where significant institutional voids are 
manifest in problems of access, SMEs in effect face a challenge of securing institutional 
attention. We found indications that the consequences of an absence of transparent rule-based 
rights to institutional support could be moderated by the power that firms possess.  Thus it was 
agreed by respondents both from Egyptian agencies and SMEs that institutions like the IMC 
gave priority to large firms which are not only of greater significance for the economy but also 
may have opportunities to overcome difficulties of access proactively through lobbying and 
offering social investments.5 Although these opportunities are not normally open to SME 
decision-makers who lack the necessary resources and social status, there were instances where 
they were able to mobilize a degree of power and secure institutional attention by acting 
collectively. Nevertheless, in general, the notion that SMEs experience a liability of smallness 
needs to include the limited power they enjoy to solicit institutional attention (compared to 
large firms) when such attention is not mandated by a universalistic rule-based system. The 
ways that they try to cope with such institutional voids is consistent with the proposition that 
organizations with little power have to rely on social mediation to cope with external challenges 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2011). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The comparison of Egypt and the UK suggests that institutional agencies can assist SMEs to 
forge network ties of a business kind which lower transaction costs and reduce the perceived 
risk of internationalization. In this way they help SMEs to venture into unfamiliar foreign 
markets. However, it was apparent that the quality of institutional support for SME 
internationalization does not just depend on the competence and resources of the agencies 
                                                 
5 The favouring of larger firms in Egypt has also been attributed to crony capitalism (The Economist, 2014). 
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concerned but also on the ease and transparency of access to their services.  For SME decision-
makers, our findings imply that while business ties offer advantages of lower cost and greater 
scope, social ties can offer specific benefits and may be in tune with cultural norms. The priority 
given to each of these two types of tie should reflect both domestic social conditions and those 
in foreign markets. This requires a careful analysis of prevailing institutions and cultures.  
 
The limitations of the study serve to indicate fruitful lines of further research. One limitation 
lies in its purpose and design.  This was exploratory and small scale. The sample included firms 
across different industries in order to achieve a balance between manufacturing and service 
firms. This means that it could not examine another concomitant of the level of economic 
development, additional to institutional voids, which might influence national contrasts in the 
networking of SMEs.  This is the tendency for more developed economies to have a higher 
incidence of non-traditional knowledge-based SMEs. Such SMEs, in industries such as biotech 
and IT, typically have their own international networks in place at an early stage in their 
development (Salavisa, Sousa & Fontes, 2012). These reduce the firms’ dependence on 
institutions for supporting internationalization and thus enable some hazards of resource 
dependence to be reduced. Nor did the present study examine systematically the extent to which 
the SMEs used other network links to reduce their dependence on domestic institutions. In 
principle, SMEs have two options for dealing with domestic institutional voids. Either they can 
try to cope with them directly, which has been the focus of our study, or they can try to initiate 
or employ other network links which enable them to bypass a dependence on institutions.  
Some of the UK firms took the second option. However, in Egypt this option was restricted by 
the preference to rely on a limited number of strong social ties as well as by institutional 
constraints such as when export permits were refused. 
  
Another limitation is that we have focused on the positive enabling aspects of networks for 
SMEs. At the same time, we noted the cost and effort required to build social network ties of 
the kind that the Egyptian SMEs heavily relied upon.  Building and maintaining such close 
network ties imposes a penalty of time and effort that may detract from pursuing 
internationalization speedily. Further research into the “darker” side of networks is required, 
including the possibility that a heavy reliance on strong social networks can constrain the scope 
of SME internationalization (Sasi & Arenius, 2008).  In addition, given the socio-political 
upheaval that Egypt experienced just after the period of this study, an investigation into how 
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this impacted on institutional voids and how SMEs responded to changes in them could be 
another fruitful avenue for future research.  
 
In conclusion, our analysis of networking by internationalizing SMEs in the light of contrasting 
levels of domestic institutional voids provides a strong pointer to the significance of inherent 
differences between developing and developed economies.  It also supports the view that the 
greater vulnerability of SMEs vis-à-vis institutions, and an explanation of their options for 
coping with this vulnerability, requires a different line of theorizing to that informed by the 
hitherto dominant focus on MNCs.  In particular, the contrasting power of MNEs and SMEs is 
a factor deserving greater attention in the future.    
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